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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Tenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! We regret that this 
year it will be a “paper only” event. The double whammy of sequestration and a continuing 
resolution, with the attendant restrictions on travel and conferences, created too much 
uncertainty to properly stage the event. We will miss the dialogue with our acquisition 
colleagues and the opportunity for all our researchers to present their work. However, we 
intend to simulate the symposium as best we can, and these Proceedings present an 
opportunity for the papers to be published just as if they had been delivered. In any case, we 
will have a rich store of papers to draw from for next year’s event scheduled for May 14–15, 
2014! 
Despite these temporary setbacks, our Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) continues at a normal pace. Since the ARP’s 
founding in 2003, over 1,200 original research reports have been added to the acquisition 
body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 70 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and encourage your future participation. 
Unfortunately, what will be missing this year is the active participation and 
networking that has been the hallmark of previous symposia. By purposely limiting 
attendance to 350 people, we encourage just that. This forum remains unique in its effort to 
bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. It provides the opportunity to interact with many top DoD 
acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal 
panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the 
day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming 
arrangements for future research work. Despite the fact that we will not be gathered 
together to reap the above-listed benefits, the ARP will endeavor to stimulate this dialogue 
through various means throughout the year as we interact with our researchers and DoD 
officials.  
Affordability remains a major focus in the DoD acquisition world and will no doubt get 
even more attention as the sequestration outcomes unfold. It is a central tenet of the DoD’s 
Better Buying Power initiatives, which continue to evolve as the DoD finds which of them 
work and which do not. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of 
great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you’re a practitioner or 
scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
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 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & 
Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, 
Department of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test, & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
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Political Connections of the Boards of Directors and 
Defense Contractors’ Excessive Profits1 
Chong Wang—Wang is an assistant professor of accounting in the Graduate School of Business & 
Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. His research fields are financial and defense related 
managerial accounting, corporate finance, and economics. Professor Wang’s work has been 
published in California Management Review, Journal of Public Procurement, Journal of Business 
Research, Journal of Financial Economics, Advances in Management Accounting, and Accounting 
and Finance. He is the co-recipient (along with Professor Joseph San Miguel) of the third place best 
paper award at the Fifth International Public Procurement Conference in 2012. Wang received a PhD 
in economics and an MS in statistics from Iowa State University. [cwang@nps.edu] 
Abstract 
Despite the fast-growing interest in the research of political connections of either private-
sector firms or states, most of the papers belong to the economics or public administration 
fields. There are few studies, if any, that look into the role of firms’ political connections in the 
defense acquisition area. This paper makes an effort to bridge this gap by investigating the 
impact of political connections on the excessive profitability of defense contractors.  
Wang and San Miguel (2012) documented that defense contractors earn excessive profits 
relative to their industry counterparts. This study extends Wang and San Miguel (2012) and 
examines whether defense contractors’ political connections (as measured by the prior 
employment histories of the board directors) influence contractors’ excessive profitability. We 
find that, in contrast to the prediction of “corruption hypothesis,” the excessive profits are less 
(more) pronounced for those contractors with politically connected (non-connected) boards. 
This casts doubt on the preconceived notion that those politically connected board members 
are corrupt in nature; rather, our findings suggest that they may use their experience to serve 
a benevolent role to the public in keeping defense contractors from opportunistic profit-
seeking behaviors that could reach or even cross the federal government’s regulatory redline. 
Introduction 
Political connections2 of either private-sector firms or public states has increasingly 
become a popular research topic among economists, business and public administration 
scholars, and political scientists. For example, in regard to states’ political connection as 
measured by representation in the U.S. Congress, scholars have documented that per 
capita federal expenditures at the state level are positively related to per capita Senate 
representation, which gives rise to a small state advantage (Atlas, Gilligan, Hendershott, & 
Zupan, 1995). No similar advantage is found if data is restricted to earmarks secured in 
House appropriations bills3 (Hoover & Pecorino, 2005; Knight, 2008). This seems to suggest 
that political connection does matter from a state’s perspective.   
Naturally, a similar research question exists for private-sector firms: that is, do 
politically connected private-sector firms derive economic benefits from such a relation? 
Most studies intended to answer this question somewhat support this conjecture. For 
instance, Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009) demonstrated that the market responds 
positively (i.e., a positive abnormal stock return is observed) to the announcement of the 
                                                
1 JEL Classifications: G38, H57, M48. 
2 There is no consensus regarding the definition of political connection. Definitions vary with specific 
studies.  
3 Note that each state has two senators, regardless of the population of the state. The representation 
in the U.S. House, however, is based on state population. 
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nomination of a board member who is politically connected from his or her prior employment 
history in the federal government, military services, or as a former representative of the U.S. 
Congress. Duchin and Sosyura (in press) investigated application data for Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP) funds and found that those firm applicants with political connections4 
were more likely to be funded. Correia (2012) found that for firms with irregular accounting 
practices, those with political connections are less likely to become the target of Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation, and if they are indeed investigated, they 
face lower penalties on average than non-connected firms. Khwaja and Mian (2005) used 
Pakistan banks’ corporate lending data to show the rent-seeking behavior of politically 
connected firms. In particular, they found that “political firms borrow 45 percent more and 
have 50 percent higher default rates. Such preferential treatment occurs exclusively in 
government banks—private banks provide no political favors” (p. 1371). It is also worth 
mentioning that these studies not only document the real impacts of political connections, 
but they also share a common theme suggesting that political connections are a source of 
corruption and underlie various rent-seeking behaviors. Simply put, political connections 
matter in a negative way. 
Despite the fast-growing interest in the research of political connections, most of the 
papers belong to the economics, political science, or public administration field. There are 
few studies, if any, that look into the role of firms’ political connection in the defense 
acquisition area, which provides another proof of the alleged disciplinary disconnect5 that 
has existed for a long time.   
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we attempt to bridge the gap that exists 
between defense acquisition study and other relevant research fields, such as economics 
and public administration. As observed by many academicians and practitioners, such a 
disengagement of defense acquisition research (with other fields) is both unfortunate and 
unjustified. The society will be better served if such a disconnection is mitigated. Toward this 
goal, we build on the extant literature and aim to investigate the impact of political 
connections (an established concept in non-defense research) on a very important topic in 
defense acquisition, that is, the excessive profitability of defense contractors. Specifically, 
Wang and San Miguel (2012) documented that defense contractors earn excessive profits 
relative to their industry counterparts. This study extends Wang and San Miguel (2012) and 
examines whether defense contractors’ political connections (as measured by the prior 
employment histories of the board directors) influence contractors’ excessive profitability.  
Our second goal is to test the “corruption hypothesis of political connections” that has 
been suggested by existing literature in a very particular and essential setting, that is, the 
nation’s biggest defense contractors’ excessive profitability. If the results support the 
                                                
4 The definition of political connection in Duchin and Sosyura (2012) takes several forms, including 
lobbying, campaign contributions, and employment history of directors. 
5 Such disconnect exists between public administration and military administration (Albano, Snider, & 
Thai, 2012), and more generally, between economics and military-related research (Rogerson, 1994). 
Rogerson (1994) stated, “Defense procurement is unique among regulated industries in the United 
States in that economists have played virtually no role in helping shape its regulatory practices and 
institutions. Perhaps this is due to the barrier to entry created by the need to first learn about 
procurement practices or to a lingering distaste for military matters among academics. Whatever the 
reason, this lack of economic input is unfortunate, because many of the regulatory and policy issues 
in defense procurement involve the types of incentive issues that economists are very good at 
analyzing. My own hope is that economists are on their way to colonizing this new policy frontier and 
that some of the ideas discussed in this article will play a role in shaping policy debates over the next 
decade” (p. 87). 
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corruption story, then political connections would become a very serious concern of policy-
makers because defense spending is a substantive portion of government expenditures. On 
the other hand, if such a conjecture is not grounded, what are the findings and what is the 
explanation? 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The section titled Sample 
describes our sample. The section titled Measuring Political Connections and Hypotheses 
Development introduces the measure of political connections, followed by the development 
of hypotheses on the relationship between excessive profitability and political connections, 
based on extant literature and observations. Empirical results and findings are in the section 
titled Empirical Results and Findings. The final section concludes the paper.  
Sample 
We start with the same sample used in Wang and San Miguel (2012). Specifically, 
they use fedspending.org as the data source to identify the top 500 recipients of defense 
contracts for 2008. Out of these top 500 firms, 112 are traded on public stock exchanges. 
These 112 public firms became the main sample of their analyses. Our sample is a reduced 
version of Wang and San Miguel (2012) in that we delete 16 firms that are missing from the 
Corporate Library database, which we use to identify the political connections of each firm’s 
board members. Table 1 lists the name, dollar awarded, rank, stock ticker, SIC code, and 
public stock exchange code for these 96 public firms.  
 Firms in The Main Sample:  96 Public U.S. Firms From the 2008 








LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP  $29,363,894,334  1 LMT 3760  11
NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP.  $23,436,442,251  2 NOC 3812  11
BOEING CO.  $21,838,400,709  3 BA 3721  11
RAYTHEON CO.  $13,593,610,345  6 RTN 3812  11
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP. $13,490,652,077  7 GD 3790  11
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP.  $8,283,275,612  8 UTX 3720  11
L‐3 COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS  $6,675,712,135  9 LLL 3663  11
KBR INC.  $5,997,147,425  10 KBR 1623  11
NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION  $4,761,740,206  11 NAV 3711  11
ITT CORPORATION  $4,355,423,578  13 ITT 3812  11
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTL CORP  $3,885,932,047  14 SAI 7373  11
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY  $3,518,136,891  15 GE 9997  11
COMPUTER SCIENCES CORP.  $3,230,197,590  16 CSC 7370  11
HUMANA, INC.  $2,952,008,623  18 HUM 6324  11
TEXTRON, INC.  $2,827,900,303  19 TXT 3721  11
HEALTH NET, INC  $2,438,349,117  21 HNT 6324  11
URS CORP.  $2,402,033,979  22 URS 8711  11
HEWLETT‐PACKARD CO.  $1,938,638,634  26 HPQ 3570  11
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=429 - 
=
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS, INC.  $1,928,045,694  27 ATK 3480  11
OSHKOSH TRUCK CORP.  $1,863,726,822  30 OSK 3711  11
HARRIS CORP.  $1,841,470,263  31 HRS 3663  11
HONEYWELL, INC.  $1,721,547,997  33 HON 3728  11
FORCE PROTECTION INDUSTRIES, (INC)  $1,360,427,189  36 FRPT 3790  14
CACI INTERNATIONAL INC  $1,324,104,004  37 CACI 7373  11
AMERISOURCE BERGEN CORP  $1,298,059,841  38 ABC 5122  11
ROCKWELL COLLINS  $1,290,813,364  39 COL 3728  11
SHAW GROUP, INC.  $1,162,267,243  40 SHAW 8711  11
VALERO ENERGY CORPORATION  $1,043,869,551  43 VLO 2911  11
JACOBS ENGINEERING GROUP INC  $951,295,410  45 JEC 1600  11
VSE CORP.  $910,970,473  47 VSEC 8711  14
MCKESSON CORPORATION  $903,799,326  48 MCK 5122  11
CARDINAL HEALTH INC  $856,333,988  50 CAH 5122  11
DELL COMPUTER CORPORATION  $852,813,703  51 DELL 3571  14
EXXON MOBIL CORP.  $836,548,150  52 XOM 2911  11
MANTECH INTERNATIONAL CORP  $655,579,972  61 MANT 7373  14
FLIR SYSTEMS, INC  $507,944,847  71 FLIR 3812  14
GOODRICH CORPORATION  $487,753,671  73 GR 3728  11
TETRA TECH, INC.  $472,960,770  77 TTEK 8711  14
IBM CORP.  $438,446,918  81 IBM 7370  11
PERINI CORP.  $436,363,793  82 TPC 1540  11
FLUOR CORP.  $430,878,065  84 FLR 1600  11
CERADYNE INC  $417,616,849  86 CRDN 3290  14
AECOM TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION  $380,250,228  91 ACM 8711  11
AT&T INC.  $371,099,463  95 T 4813  11
KRAFT FOODS INC  $367,840,952  97 KFT 2000  11
OWENS & MINOR INC  $365,861,498  99 OMI 5047  11
CUBIC CORP.  $354,623,567  102 CUB 3812  11
GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK 
CORPORATION  $324,475,211   113  GLDD  1600  14 
CATERPILLAR, INC.  $323,676,276  114 CAT 3531  11
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO.  $321,983,149  115 PG 2840  11
TYSON FOODS INC  $319,486,334  117 TSN 2011  11
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS  $319,365,283  118 VZ 4812  11
CHEVRONTEXACO CORPORATION  $310,558,853  122 CVX 2911  11
SRA INTERNATIONAL, INC.  $297,913,799  128 SRX 7370  11
GRANITE CONSTRUCTION CO.  $292,263,100  131 GVA 1600  11
ACCENTURE  $288,517,607  132 ACN 8742  11
JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC.  $285,123,825  134 JCI 2531  11
EXPRESS SCRIPTS  $215,750,049  162 ESRX 6411  14
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CONOCOPHILLIPS  $206,348,789  167 COP 2911  11
TYCO INTERNATIONAL LTD  $202,567,751  172 TYC 9997  11
COMTECH TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORP.  $202,082,670  173 CMTL 3663  14
GENERAL MILLS, INC.  $200,017,932  176 GIS 2040  11
TESORO HAWAII CORPORATION  $199,447,230  177 TSO 2911  11
AEROVIRONMENT INC  $192,462,098  182 AVAV 3721  14
AAR CORP.  $187,717,969  187 AIR 5080  11
SYSCO CORPORATION  $179,074,006  195 SYY 5140  11
REFINERY HOLDING COMPANY L P  $177,749,226  198 WNR 2911  11
DEERE & CO.  $164,340,456  206 DE 3523  11
VIASAT, INC  $156,815,300  217 VSAT 3663  14
ORBITAL SCIENCES CORP.  $153,884,356  223 ORB 3760  11
PEPSICO INC  $149,527,183  231 PEP 2080  11
UNISYS  $142,990,124  239 UIS 7373  11
BALL CORP  $131,696,095  259 BLL 3411  11
CONAGRA, INC.  $125,264,234  270 CAG 2000  11
ORACLE CORP.  $122,646,803  274 ORCL 7372  14
GENERAL MOTORS CORP.  $120,929,817  279 GM 3711  11
EATON CORP.  $117,792,917  286 ETN 3620  11
UNILEVER NV  $112,089,508  292 UL 2000  11
MOOG, INC.  $111,608,841  293 MOG.A 3728  11
ALON USA L.P.  $111,102,800  296 ALJ 2911  11
COCA‐COLA ENTERPRISES INC  $93,991,833  343 CCE 2086  11
XEROX CORP.  $91,275,424  356 XRX 3577  11
JOHNSON & JOHNSON  $89,990,235  363 JNJ 2834  11
CAMPBELL SOUP CO.  $88,645,010  367 CPB 2030  11
INTERMEC CORPORATION  $83,566,808  388 IN 3577  11
CAE CORP  $83,563,697  389 CAE 3690  11
DEL MONTE FOODS COMPANY  $77,962,809  419 DLM 2000  11
AMERICAN SCIENCE AND ENGRG  $76,545,302   429  ASEI  3844  14 
MICHAEL BAKER CORP.  $74,263,592  437 BKR 8711  12
KIMBERLY‐CLARK CORP.  $69,832,351  454 KMB 2621  11
ESTERLINE TECHNOLOGIES CORP  $68,716,933  462 ESL 3823  11
INTEGRAL SYSTEMS, INC.  $67,261,245  473 ISYS 7373  14
MINE SAFETY APPLIANCES CO.  $67,166,647  474 MSA 3842  11
WORLD FUEL SERVICE CORP.  $66,258,375  478 INT 5172  11
SARA LEE CORPORATION  $65,361,053  482 SLE 2000  11
WILLIAMS COMPANIES INC  $65,024,852  483 WMB 4922  11
HORIZON LINES LLC  $65,008,856  484 HRZ 4400  11
Table1 shows that most of the firms in our sample are listed on the NYSE or 
NASDAQ, indicating that big defense contractors are likely to be established companies. For 
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each of the 96 firms, we use their stock ticker to map into the Compustat database and 
extract various accounting variables across a three-year range of 2007–2009. Note that our 
base year is 2008. The reason we include two additional years of data (i.e., 2007, one year 
prior, and 2009, one year after) is to expand the sample size and simultaneously ensure that 
the status of the top 500 defense contractors in 2008, as well as the political connections of 
the board members in 2008, can be assumed to be stationary and be passed onto 2007 and 
2009 for the same firm, due to a short elapse of time. Expanding our sample to a three-year 
range yields a total of 276 firm-years, with 93 each for 2007 and 2009 and 90 for 2008. 
Following Wang and San Miguel (2012), we denote the excessive profit of a particular firm-
year as the difference between this firm-year’s return on assets (ROA)6 and the ROA of an 
“industry-year-size” matched benchmark firm that is not on the 112-firm list.7  
Table 2 presents basic statistics of descriptive accounting measures for the 90 
sample firms in Fiscal Year 2008.8 In particular, we report total assets, total sales (revenue), 
dollar awarded as percentage of revenue, and excessive profit as measured by the matched 
ROA. The mean values of total assets and total revenue were $35 billion and $33 billion, 
respectively. The government contracts contributed about 18% of these firms’ 2008 revenue 
on average.9 Overall, these firms earned an excessive ROA of 3%, which is statistically 
significant at a 5% significance level, confirming Wang and San Miguel’s (2012) findings that 
top defense contractors receive excessive profits relative to their industry peers.  
                                                
6 To keep the paper concise, we exclusively use ROA as the profitability metric in this study. Other 
alternative profit measures yield similar results. 
7 “The benchmark firm-year is selected based on a three-dimension match on industry, year and size. 
Specifically, we go to the same industry-year where industry membership is defined as four-digit SIC 
codes, and identify the non-defense (i.e., not on our 112-firm list) firm that has the best size match 
with our defense firm-year. The difference between the profit of the firm-year investigated and the 
profit of the benchmark firm-year will be the measure of ‘excessive profit’” (Wang & San Miguel, 2012, 
p. 397). 
8 We lost six firms for Year 2008 due to missing data from Compustat. 
9 A concern that has been raised here is that a significant portion of our sample firms may have much 
lower than 18% of their total revenue that is attributable to DoD contracts, and hence, are not really 
“defense contractors” as the term is generally understood. Consequently, if Sara Lee had only 1% of 
2008 sales from defense contracts, one cannot attribute much, if any, of Sara Lee’s excessive profits 
to its defense contracts. We provide a few arguments to address the aforementioned concern. First, 
our sample focuses on DoD contractors, a much broader concept than a few prominent major 
weapon manufacturers. In that regard, an average 18% revenue from DoD is a reasonably decent 
number. Second, the central metric of our analysis is the excessive profit, and because profit is only a 
small portion of revenue, a relatively small percentage of DoD revenue could have a much larger 
impact on profit if firms do derive larger profits from DoD contracts than they can generate from their 
non-DoD business. Third, it is worth mentioning that the specific concern as expressed by using the 
Sara Lee example above is already addressed, if not completely removed, by our definition of the 
three-way industry-year-size matched excessive profit measure. In particular, if Sara Lee had a super 
good year for whatever reason that is non-DoD related, we expect that its benchmark firm, i.e., the 
firm that is in the same industry and has similar size (but without federal contracts), would also be 
impacted in a similar way and display a superior profit likewise in the same year. Hence, the 
excessive profit of Sara Lee, which is the difference between Sara Lee’s profit and its benchmark 
firm’s profit, would be only attributable to the fact that Sara Lee has DoD contracts while its 
benchmark firm has not. Last but not least, despite that we believe our current full-sample approach 
is sound, we nevertheless proceed to perform a robustness analysis, which only includes the 
subsample that consists of only those firms with at least 25% of total revenue generated from DoD 
contracts. Untabulated results show that all our findings are intact.       
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 The Basic Statistics of 90 Sample Firms in Year 2008 
 Mean Median Min Max Std Dev 
Total Assets (millions) 34,962 7,242 147 797,769 94,895 
Total Sales (millions) 32,656 12,542 160 425,071 59,570 
Dollar Awarded as Percent 
of Sales (%) 
17.56 6 0.06 103.00 22.79 
Excessive ROA 0.03 0.02 -0.18 0.32 0.10 
Measuring Political Connections and Hypotheses Development 
Measuring Political Connections 
There is no unanimously agreed-upon definition of the term political connection.10 
Scholars have used various forms of concepts in different research settings. For example, 
Mara Faccio, in a series of solo and coauthored papers,11 defined a firm’s political 
connection as follows: “A company is defined as being connected with a politician if at least 
one of its largest shareholders (anyone controlling at least 10 percent of voting shares) or 
one of its top officers (CEO, president, vice-president, chairman, or secretary) is a member 
of parliament, a minister, or is closely related to a top politician or party” (Faccio, 2006, p. 
369). This definition by Faccio is not appropriate for any U.S.-based study because U.S. 
regulations pretty much rule out the possibility of anybody simultaneously serving a high-
rank public service role and a top executive role in a private-sector firm. In the United States, 
if a present executive of a private-sector firm is appointed as a high-rank government 
official, he or she must quit his or her current job. As a testimony of this fact, Faccio (2010) 
found that under her definition, only 13 out of the 6,007 U.S. firms in the Worldscope 
database can be labeled as “politically connected firms.”  In short, this first definition applies 
more to international countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, or Italy. 
The second definition of political connection focuses on campaign contributions and 
lobbying activities. For instance, Correia (2012) found that firms’ political connections 
established by contributions to congressmen and by lobbying the SEC reduce those firms’ 
enforcement costs by the SEC. Specifically, those firms are less likely to be investigated by 
the SEC, and even if they are investigated, the average penalty is lower for them. Other 
studies that adopted this definition include Roberts (1990), Kroszner and Stratmann (1998), 
and Ang and Boyer (2000). The problem with this definition is the low explanatory power. 
For instance, Goldman et al. (2009) found that controlling industry effect significantly 
reduces the explanatory power of campaign donation. Moreover, Jayachandran (2006) 
questioned the causal effect of firms’ donations on firm value. To recap, the second 
definition, based on campaign donation or lobbying expenditure, at most provides a noisy 
measure of political connection. 
The third alternative definition of political connection is derived from board directors’ 
prior employment history in the federal government, including in the legislative, executive, 
and judiciary branches, and in the military Services. Since in the U.S., congressmen, 
government executives, and military generals are allowed to serve on the boards of private-
sector firms after their retirement from public service (and they frequently do so), firms’ 
                                                
10 From this point on, we restrict our attention on political connections to private-sector firms rather 
than public states. One example of a public state’s political connection was introduced previously. 
11 See Faccio (2006), Faccio (2010), Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006), and Chaney, Faccio, 
and Parsley (2011). 
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political connections through board members receive substantial attention. Many U.S.-based 
studies follow the suit of this particular definition. To name a few, Agrawal and Knoeber 
(2001) found that firms for which politics plays a more important role tend to be more 
“politically connected” (i.e., they tend to have more politically experienced directors on their 
boards). Goldman et al. (2009) showed the market value relevance of the addition of a 
newly appointed, politically connected board member. Moreover, they differentiate between 
political connections to the Republican versus Democratic parties and provide evidence that 
the market values of these two different types of politically connected firms responded 
differently to George W. Bush’s 2000 presidential win.  
Since our sample is strictly U.S. based, it is natural to follow the third definition of 
political connection. Specifically, we use the 2008 Directorships database that is provided by 
Corporate Library LLC. In this annual directorship dataset, Corporate Library records each 
individual director’s information through compiling data from firms’ publicly disclosed proxy 
statements. One key field in this database is a director’s biography, including detailed 
employment history. We use a series of keywords to search each individual director’s 
biography statement and identify whether this particular director is politically connected. The 
keywords we use are comprehensive to ensure a maximum catch of politically connected 
directors. The complete list of our search keywords follows: senator, congressman, 
congresswoman, congress, representative, federal, secretary, admiral, general, army, navy, 
air force, department of defense, DoD, commissioner, ambassador, administrator, attorney 
general, governor, director, council.   
We apply this keyword search to the biography statement as of Year 2008 for each 
director who sits on the board of any of our 96 sample firms. Once we find a “hit” of a 
keyword, we read the biography and make sure this particular director is correctly flagged as 
one who is politically connected.12 At Year 2008, our 96 sample firms have 989 directors in 
total, indicating an average board size of 10.3 directors. Out of these 989 directors, 923 are 
unique individuals, of which 157 are identified as politically connected directors. Put simply, 
17% of the directors have prior employment history with the federal government or military 
Services. The data also indicate that 77 out of 96 firms have at least one politically 
connected director on their board; that is, 80% of our top defense contractors have some 
degree of political connection through the board of directors. To get a benchmark sense, it is 
worth mentioning that Goldman et al. (2009), using a very similar definition of political 
connection as our study, documented that at Year 2000, 153 of the S&P 500 companies 
(i.e., 31%) had at least one board member with a political connection. Therefore, the main 
message is that top defense contractors are much more likely to have a politically connected 
board than non-contractor firms.      
                                                
12 An example of a politically connected director’s profile is General John M. Shalikashvili, who served 
as a board director of L-3 Communications Holdings, Inc., at Year 2008. The following excerpt was 
from the company’s proxy statement: “General John M. Shalikashvili, director since August 1998 and 
member of the Compensation and Nominating/Corporate Governance Committees. General 
Shalikashvili (U.S. Army—Ret.) is an independent consultant and a Visiting Professor at Stanford 
University. General Shalikashvili was the senior officer of the United States military and principal 
military advisor to the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense and the National 
Security Council when he served as the thirteenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department 
of Defense, for two terms from 1993 to 1997. Prior to his tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, he served as the Commander in Chief of all United States forces in Europe and as NATO’s 
tenth Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). He has also served in a variety of command 
and staff positions in the continental United States, Alaska, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Korea, Turkey 
and Vietnam.” 
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Hypotheses Development 
In this subsection, we derive alternative hypotheses on the relationship between 
defense contractors’ excessive profitability and their political connections, based on extant 
literature and observations. Most of the prior literature suggests the “corruption” role of 
political connection (i.e., the firms with political connections opportunistically take advantage 
of this favorable relation and inappropriately derive private benefits for the firm at the 
sacrifice of social welfare). For example, Duchin and Sosyura (in press) found that politically 
connected firms are more likely to get TARP funds, yet their performance was inferior to that 
of unconnected firms. This clearly indicates that political connection is a source of 
“corruption” and “inefficiency.” Correia (2012) presented evidence showing that firms use 
their political influence to avoid the scrutiny of the SEC or mitigate the punitive damage in 
the case of financial reporting irregularity. Faccio et al. (2006) analyzed a unique dataset 
that covers 35 countries during 1997–2002 and found that those politically connected firms 
are far more likely to be bailed out during financial distress than non-connected firms in a 
similar economic crisis. Moreover, after bailout, those firms with political connections 
significantly underperform unconnected firms. Chaney et al. (2011) documented that 
politically connected firms have poorer earnings quality than their non-connected 
counterparts. All of the studies mentioned previously collectively convey a consistent 
message: that is, political connection is associated with various rent-seeking behaviors. 
Applying this corruption proposition of political connections to the defense contractors’ 
excessive profit, we have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis (H): The defense contractors’ excessive profitability is more 
pronounced for those with political connections. Non-connected firms should 
exhibit a less excessive profit. 
While this hypothesis sounds like a reasonable conjecture given all evidence in the 
extant literature, an alternative hypothesis nevertheless could exist. In particular, if defense 
contractors, a unique subset of universal firms, have different and non-opportunistic motives 
for establishing political connections, then the story could be very different. Given the unique 
nature of the defense procurement business, it is quite likely that commonality may not 
prevail here. For instance, one distinctive feature of defense-related business is the 
complexity of regulation, which often requires substantive professional and inside 
knowledge to truly understand. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) alone consists of 
thousands of pages full of government-specific terminologies. Further, a firm that is doing 
business with the Department of Defense (DoD) is under the scrutiny of various government 
agencies, such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Defense Contract Audit 
Agency (DCAA), and others. There is a high cost of non-compliance. A defense contractor 
that is found to engage in misconduct could face various penalties including settlement with 
fine, civil or criminal investigation, suspension, or even debarment. If defense contractors 
believe that these redlines are costly to cross, they may have incentives to hire the best 
talent with professional and institutional knowledge to help them avoid such behavior. For 
example, a March 22, 1991, article in The Wall Street Journal, titled “Northrop Nominates 
Three for Its Board,” reported that 
The nominees are Joseph A. Califano Jr., 59 years old, a Washington 
attorney and former Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare under 
President Jimmy Carter; Jack Edwards, 62, a Washington lawyer and 
formerly the ranking Republican congressman on the Defense Appropriations 
Subcommittee; and retired Gen. John T. Chain Jr., 56, a 35-year Air Force 
veteran who this year retired as commander-in-chief of the Strategic Air 
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Command to become executive vice president of operations of Burlington 
Northern Railroad Co. 
A company spokesman said in the news announcement, “[These] board members 
are chosen for the breadth of their experience and counsel” (“Northrop Nominates,” 1991). 
Moreover, Kent Kresa, then Northrop president and chief executive officer, further 
commented, “These men bring to Northrop unsurpassed experience and knowledge in their 
own fields, and a diversity that will serve us well as we shape the company to match the 
changes taking place in the country and the world” (“Northrop Nominates,” 1991). Note that 
two of the individuals are attorneys and all three of them had extensive and high-profile 
government or military experiences. Their expertise and experience, if used under good 
intention, would greatly help Northrop comply with the regulatory and executive rules. 
Recognizing this potential competing theory, we offer the following alternative hypothesis: 
Alternative Hypothesis (AH): The defense contractors’ excessive profitability 
is less pronounced for those with political connections. Non-connected firms 
should exhibit a more excessive profit. 
Both H and AH have reasonable justifications. Which one is factually supported? The 
next section empirically investigates this issue.  
Empirical Results and Findings 
Univariate Analysis 
We first report the univariate statistics of key variables. Recall from the Sample 
section that we have 276 firm-years in a three-year range of 2007–2009. We classify each 
of these 276 firm-years into one of the two mutually exclusive groups. The first group, 
labeled as “non-politically connected” firms, consists of all firm-years for which none of a 
firm’s Year-2008 board members had political connection through his or her prior 
employment. All of the other firm-years that are not in the first group had at least one of the 
firm’s board members being classified as a “politically connected director” and hence belong 
to the second group called “politically connected” firms. Out of the 276 firm-years, 54 are 
politically non-connected and 222 are connected.   
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 The Univariate Comparison of Key Variables Between Politically 
Connected and Non-Connected Firm-Years 


























Excessive ROA  0.01 0.08 
We have several immediate observations from Table 3. First, politically connected 
defense contracting firms are much bigger than non-connected ones. Measured by assets 
(revenue), a typical politically connected firm is three (one-and-a-half) times as big as a 
typical non-connected firm. Second, defense contracts account for a much bigger portion of 
total revenue for politically connected contractors than for non-connected ones. Specifically, 
about 21.6% (as opposed to 8.5%) of total revenue is generated by defense contracts for 
politically connected firms (as opposed to non-connected firms). This particular evidence is 
consistent with Agrawal and Knoeber (2001), who found that for those firms in which sales 
to government plays a more important role, the presence of politically connected directors 
on the board is greater as well. It is also in line with the finding of Goldman, Rocholl & So (in 
press) that political connections affect the allocation of procurement contracts. Nevertheless, 
we would like to stress that just because there is a positive association between the political 
connection and the defense contract dollar as a percentage of revenue does not necessarily 
indicate a rent-seeking or corruption story. It is plausible that the hiring of political 
experience is well intentioned and that those valuable experiences are legitimately used to 
compete for government contracts in a lawful and ethical way. Last but not least, a 
univariate comparison on excessive profits (as measured by excessive ROA) between 
politically connected and non-connected groups demonstrates that the former displays a 
much less pronounced excessive profit than the latter (4% versus 1%). This suggests that 
preliminary evidence casts doubt on the corruption (or rent-seeking) hypothesis and favors 
our alternative hypothesis, which supports the non-opportunistic motives for establishing 
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political connections. That said, a more sophisticated approach (beyond univariate analysis) 
is needed to provide more convincing evidence.  
Multivariate Analysis 
In this subsection, we use a multivariate regression method to examine whether the 
evidence against the corruption hypothesis in a univariate context persists in a multivariate 
setting. Put another way, we want to inspect whether our preliminary finding based on a 
univariate relation is robust to controlling all known determinants of defense contractors’ 
excessive profits. Needless to say, our dependent variable (i.e., the left-hand-side variable) 
is the firms’ excessive profits, and our main variable of interest on the right-hand side is the 
firms’ political connections. To ensure that the impact of political connection on excessive 
profit is incremental to the effects of all the other known determinants of excessive profits, 
we need to include a set of control variables on the right-hand side of the regression. Wang 
and San Miguel (2012), a recent work on defense contractors’ excessive profits, provided us 
with a reference for that purpose. 
Wang and San Miguel (2012) not only confirmed the existence of defense 
contractors’ excessive profits but also they document two determinants of excessive 
profitability. In particular, by showing defense contractors’ excessive profits being more 
pronounced after 1992, they argued that the post-1992 significant industry consolidation 
improved the bargaining power of the newly combined firms and, in turn, amplified these 
firms’ profitability. This basically indicates that the degree of industry concentration is a key 
determinant of excessive profit. The second determinant documented by Wang and San 
Miguel (2012) is the quality of corporate governance, as measured by the duality of the chief 
executive officer (CEO) and the chairman of the board. The main justification behind this 
relation is that poorer corporate governance exacerbates firms’ rent-seeking behavior that 
arises from substantial information asymmetry between the government and defense 
contractors. 
In addition to the two determinants from Wang and San Miguel (2012), that is, the 
degree of industry concentration and the quality of corporate governance, we also include 
the size of the firm as a third control variable. There are two reasons for doing that. First, 
firm size is a commonly used control variable in empirical corporate finance studies. The 
justification is that size is such a “composite” variable that incorporates so many 
characteristics and information that for any particular study, it is a noisy measure of the 
particular variable of interest, yet a universal and perfect control variable that is nice to be 
included on the right-hand side. Second, Table 3 clearly shows that there is a negative 
correlation between the size of the firm and the firm’s excessive profitability, and a positive 
correlation between the size of the firm and the firm’s political connection; that is, smaller 
defense contractors tend to exhibit more pronounced excessive profits and less political 
connection relative to bigger ones. Hence, it is appropriate to include the size of the firm as 
a control to avoid the potential correlated omitted variable problem that could damage the 
statistical inferences of the multivariate regression model.  
So the multivariate regression includes three control variables besides the variable of 
interest (i.e., political connection). The dependent variable is, of course, the excessive 
profits as defined by a three-way industry-year-size matched excessive ROA,13 as 
elaborated in Wang and San Miguel (2012). The empirical proxies for the three control 
variables are as follows: we use a logarithm of total revenue as “firm size,” the duality of 
CEO and chairman of the board as a binary measure of “corporate governance,” and the 
                                                
13 Where industry is defined as four-digit SIC code, size is defined as total assets. Alternative 
definitions yield similar results. 
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=438 - 
=
percentage of industry revenue represented by the largest four firms within the industry as a 
gauge of the degree of industry concentration. Same as Wang and San Miguel (2012), we 
extract total revenue from Compustat and assess whether the CEO is also the chairman of 
the board from firms’ proxy statements. Regarding the proxy for the degree of industry 
concentration, we use the Year-2007 “Concentration Ratios” published by the Census 
Bureau of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Table 4 reports the regression results.  







Dependent Variable: Industry-Year-Size Matched Excessive ROA 
Excessive ROA= a+ b*political connection +c*corporate governance+ d*firm size+ 
e*industry concentration 
Political Connection measured by a 
dummy indicator 
Political Connection measured by the percent 
of politically connected directors in the Board 





        (0.01)*** 
-0.07 
      (0.04)** 
CEO-Chairman  




  0.01 




       (0.05)** 
-0.08 





      (0.03)** 
0.11 
     (0.02)** 
Notes. * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, *** indicates 1% 
significance level; CEO-Chairman dummy takes value of one if the CEO is also the chairman; Firm 
size is defined as logarithm of total revenue; Industry concentration is defined as the percentage of 
industry revenue represented by the largest four companies within the industry. 
Table 4 shows that excessive profitability is lower for those firms with political 
connections, regardless of whether political connection is measured as a binary indicator 
variable or as the percentage of politically connected directors on the board. The magnitude 
of the impact is both statistically and economically significant. Moreover, this result holds 
after controlling other known determinants of excessive profits. The signs of all the control 
variables are as expected, and the magnitudes of the coefficients of control variables are 
significant except for the corporate governance proxy. Overall, the multivariate regression 
results reject the corruption or rent-seeking hypothesis and suggest a non-opportunistic 
motive of establishing political connections through board directors’ prior experience. 
Conclusion 
Using a slightly reduced sample from the one used by Wang and San Miguel (2012), 
we investigate the impact of political connections on excessive profits of defense 
contractors. We measure political connections by searching the biographies of board 
directors in the firms’ proxy statements. We find that defense contractors are more likely to 
have politically connected director(s) in their board; moreover, among defense contractors, 
those with a politically connected board tend to have a higher percentage of revenue from 
defense contracts than those without political connection. While the evidence may suggest 
that defense contractors have stronger incentives to establish political connections through 
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the recruitment of board directors, and those directors may indeed help the firm to compete 
for government contracts, they do not necessarily support a “rent-seeking” or “corruption” 
hypothesis. In fact, in testing the “corruption hypothesis” versus an alternative “non-
opportunistic motive hypothesis” in the setting of defense contractors’ excessive profits, we 
find strong evidence refuting the former and in favor of the latter. This suggests that defense 
contractors may hire those politically connected directors and use their experience to serve 
a benevolent role to the public. For instance, one legitimate use of the political experience is 
to keep defense contractors from opportunistic profit-seeking behaviors that could reach or 
even cross federal government regulatory redlines.    
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